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1. In a computer context, the term access means an individual's ability to get at the 
resources of a computer, including physical devices and data. Accessing data may involve 
reading, modifying, or erasing data items. Unauthorized access is access through which an 
unauthorized individual reads, modifies, or erases data for an impermissible purpose. See 
Note, Hacking-The Unauthorised Access o/Computer Systems; The Legal Implications, 52 
MOD. L. REv. 236, 237 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Hacking-The Unauthorised Access] 
("Computer hacking is the accessing of computer-stored information without the permis­
sion of the owner of the computer system or the information."). 
When computers were first invented, the term hacker was an appellation of honor, not 
a derogation. Programmers in academic research labs with access to early computers (in 
the late 1950s and the 1960s) took pride in improving the function and performance of the 
machines. Their philosophy embraced sharing and decentralization of computer knowl­
edge, openness of discussion, and esteem for "innovation, style, and technical virtuosity." 
See S. LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE CoMPUTER REVOLUTION 10 (1984). The 
skilled programmers, known as hackers, had an irresistible urge to understand the work­
ings of others' programs and to use that understanding to improve those programs to the 
benefit of all machine users. To facilitate program improvement, hackers made all pro­
grams accessible to all users, who then "could go through the programs of the master 
hackers, looking for ideas, admiring the code. The idea was that computer programs be­
longed not to individuals, but to the world of users." /d. at 115. This ethos facilitated 
program improvements that were a great impetus to the development of better computer 
systems, but it was no match for the sense of property rights held by increasing numbers of 
users who valued the result of the computer's work and wanted to keep it and the programs 
that were generated private. Over time, hacker came to mean any individual who, mostly 
for the challenge of it, sought to access computer systems whether or not they were author­
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systems, many people were tolerant of the perpetrators' ingenuity be­
cause the results of the unauthorized access were benign.2 Public reac­
tion changed, however, when unauthorized access led to lost or 
scrambled files3 and necessitated system downtime in order to cleanse 
ized to do so. See Note, Computer Crime and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of1986, 
10 CoMPUTER/L.J. 71, 73 n.ll (1990) [hereinafter Note, Abuse Act]. 
2. See Reid, Reflections on Some Recent Widespread Computer Break-Ins, 30 COMM. 
OF THE ACM 103, 103-05 (1987). 
Other reasons for ambivalence include: the necessity for special expertise in order to 
understand the technology of the crime; preparation of a case against a suspect can be time 
consuming and tedious; the "criminals" seem more clever than dangerous; and finally, 
large banks and businesses, rather than individuals, are the usual victims. Note, Computer 
Viruses and the Law, 93 DICK. L. REV. 625, 630 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Computer Vi­
ruses] (citing Gemignani, What is Computer Crime. and Why Should We Care?, 10 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 55, 56 (1987-88»; see Volgyes, The Investigation. Prosecution. and 
Prevention ofComputer Crime: A State-ofthe-Art Review, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 385, 394-402 
(1980) (discussing federal statutes regarding computer crime); Note, Computer Crime Stat­
utes: Are They Bridging the Gap Between Law and Technology, II CRIM. JUST. J. 203, 206 
(1988) [hereinafter Note, Bridging the Gap] (Most computer crimes are hard to detect; 
consequently, they go undetected and unpunished.). 
Sometimes, these "criminals" are not prosecuted because no harm is done or the in­
truder is not detected. The fervor with which one prosecutes depends' upon what the 
hacker does upon entry into the system. 
Once the hacker has penetrated the computer system he may do one of sev­
eral things. He may just read or copy the information, which may be highly 
confidential; he may erase or change some or all of the information or he may 
simply add something, such as a message boasting of his feat. The legal implica­
tions depend upon which of these acts it is that the hacker performs. . . . The 
worrying point of this is that, although people such as these intend no harm, they 
demonstrate the weak security aspects of computer systems. If they can get in, 
then so can others who will have less agreeable motives. 
Note, Hacking-The Unauthorised Access, supra note I, at 237; see also Note, Bridging the 
Gap, supra, at 203 (" 'Most non-violent crimes and even violent crimes such as homicide 
can be committed through or facilitated by computers.''' (quoting S. NYCUM & D. 
PARKER, PROSECUTORIAL EXPERIENCE WITH STATE COMPUTER CRIME LAWS 34 
(1986»). 
3. 	 These lost or scrambled files are sometimes the result of computer viruses. 
Computer viruses are computer instructions or small hidden programs that 
are inserted into a standard computer program or into a computer's operating 
system. These instructions may replicate many times during a single program 
execution, infect every program on a computer disk and be passed on secretly to 
other computers through modems, floppy discs, or network connections. 
A programmer creates a virus by writing a computer code which can attach 
itself to other programs. Once attached, this code may alter the operations of a 
program or destroy data kept on a computer disk. A virus can "infect" a com­
puter system as a result of programming or by users running an already infected 
computer program on the system. Unsuspecting users running virus-infected pro­
grams allow the virus to establish itself in a computer system. Once established, 
the virus can access and modify any file the user is authorized to access. Similar 
to a biological virus, a computer virus spreads rapidly from a single point of infec­
tion. MUltiplying in geometrical progression as it works its way through a com­
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or reconstruct the systems.4 When unauthorized access resulted in 
damage,S people began to look at computer systems as entities worthy 
puter system or network, the computer virus may contaminate all files within a 
computer system. 
A computer virus basically carries a genetic code in machine language. The 
virus may be benign or malicious. A malicious virus can cripple a network with 
dead-end tasks, erase files, create false information, and in some cases, destroy 
equipment. 
Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2, at 627 (footnotes omitted). 
Other forms of a computer crippling code are logic bombs, time bombs and worms. A 
logic bomb is program code embedded in other code that, when triggered, is intended to 
exhibit destructive behavior. A time bomb is code that unleashes its destructive behavior at 
a preprogrammed time and date. A worm is code that replicates itself across computer 
systems. Id. at 628. For additional information on logic bombs and worms, see 
Gemignani, supra note 2, at 64 nn.38 & 39. 
A more technical definition of a virus is as follows: 
[A] virus program is a program that has the following attributes: (1) It must be 
capable of modifying software not belonging to the virus by attaching its program 
structure to the other program. (2) It must be capable of executing this modifica­
tion on a number of programs. (3) It must have the capability of recognizing the 
modification on other programs. (4) It must have the ability to prevent further 
modification of the same program upon recognition of a previous modification. 
(5) Modified software produced by the virus must have attributes (1) through (4). 
A program lacking anyone of these characteristics is not technically considered a 
virus. 
Note, Computer Viruses: Is There a Legal "Antibiotic?", 16 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. 
L.J. 253, 255 n.12 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Legal Antibiotic]; see BloomBecker, Computer 
Crime Update: The View as We Exit /984, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 627 (1985). 
4. See generally Mace, Virus Outbreaks Spur Congress to Combat Threat, IN­
FOWORLD, May 22, 1989, at 34, col. 5. The damages due to intruders have prompted the 
proposal of federal legislation to create "criminal penalties for knowingly inserting viruses 
that could cause loss, expense, or risk to health or welfare." Id. See generally Gemignani, 
supra note 2, at 55; Tunick, Computer Law: An Overview, 13 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 315, 326 
(1980) ("Experts believe that computer crime is almost impossible to detect and that it 
costs the public at least $10 billion annually."); Note, Who is Calling Your Computer Next? 
Hacker!, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 89, 89 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Hacker!]; Note, Legal Antibi­
otic, supra note 3, at 253 ("Between January and September of 1988 an estimated 250,000 
U.S. computer users were affected by programs that could have potentially destroyed all 
valuable data within their computer systems."). 
5. Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 206 ("Computer crime yields extraordina­
rily higher profits per incident than traditional fraud and theft. Estimates of the average 
proceeds have ranged from $10,517 to $450,000." (footnotes omitted». 
There are five categories of common computer crime: financial crimes, property 
crimes, information crimes, theft of services, and vandalism. In addition, there are five 
phases of computer operation during which a criminal can intervene in the process: input, 
programming, processing in the central processing unit, output and communication of 
data. Tunick, supra note 4, at 326, 328. But see Note, Computer Abuse: The Emerging 
Crime and the Need/or Legislation, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 74-75 (1984) [hereinafter 
Note, Computer Abuse] ("Computer crime falls into four categories: (1) theft of money, 
financial instruments, property, services, or valuable data; (2) unauthorized access to com­
puter time; (3) illegal use of computer programs; and (4) unauthorized acquisition of stored 
data." (footnotes omitted». 
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of legal protection. As a result, state6 and federaF computer crime8 
statutes have been enacted in the last five years,9 and additional bills 
6. See. e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § ~3a-251 
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.01-07 (West Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-602 
(Supp. 1990); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02 (Vernon Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
'. § 943.70 (1990). 
For articles discussing state computer crime statutes, see BloomBecker, supra note 3, 
at 627; Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs and Computer Rogues: Tailoring the Pun­
ishment to Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 30-37 (1990); 

Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REV. 681, 710-15 (1980); Leder­
. man, Criminal Liability for Breach 0/ Confidential Commercial In/ormation, 38 EMORY 

L.J. 921 (1989); Comment, Computer Crime Deterrence, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391, 399-404 
(1986); Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 209-213,220-23; Note, Hacker!, supra note 
~, at 102-07; Note, Abuse Act, supra note 1, at 75-76; Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2, 
at 641 (containing a list of relevant state statutes for forty-eight states); Note, Computer 
Abuse, supra note 5, at 89-94; Note, An Overview 0/Recent Changes in California Computer 
Crime Laws: The Criminalization 0/ Computer Contamination and Strengthened Penalty 
Provisions, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 135-42 (1990) (discussing sig­
nificant changes in and additions to current California law dealing with computer crime 
!lnd 'new antiviral legislation); see also Branscomb, supra at 37-44 (discussing state legisla­
tionpendlng in the Spring of 1989). See generally Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects 0/ 
Computer Abuse: Part I: State Penal Laws, 5 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 271, 276-95 
(1976). . 
For examples of cases litigated under the California statute, see People v. Lowery, 200 
Cal~ App. 3d 1207,246 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1988); Mahru v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 
545, i37 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1987); People v. Gopal, 171 Cal. App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487 
(1985). 
7.. See. e.g., Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1725; 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848; The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213. For law 
review articles discussing various federal computer crime statutes, see Branscomb, supra 
note 6, at 44-48; Lederman, supra note 6, at 931-32, 978-93; Comment, supra note 6, at 
392-99; Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 213-15, 217-20; Note, Hacker!, supra note 
4, at 99-102; Note, Abuse Act, supra note 1, at 76-84; Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2, 
at 636-38; Note, Computer Abuse, supra note 5, at 77-84; Note, The Electronic Communica­
tions Privacy Act 0/ 1986: The Impact on'So/tware Communications Technologies, 2 
SofTWARE L.J. 243 (1988). 
8. The delay in bringing about legislation may be due to the lack of agreement as to a 
. definition of "computer crime." The following are samples of the various definitions em­
ployed. A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 4 (1978) (A computer crime is "the use ofa com­
puter to perpetuate acts' of deceit, concealment and guile that have as their objective the 
obtaining of property, money, services, and political and business advantages."); Taber, A 
Survey 0/ Computer Crime Studies, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 275, 298 (1980) (A genuine com­
puter crime is "8 crime that, in fact, occurred and in which a computer was directly and 
significantly instrumental. "). 
. 9. Although computers have been used widely by society for a number of years, only 
reCently has legislation been enacted. This is because some legislators have relied on the 
courts to fashion existing criminal laws to combat computer abuse. For examples of cases 
which have tried to construe existing law to extend to computer cases, see Gemignani, 
supra note 2, at 55-67. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 394-95 (addressing specific 
examples of computer crimes which courts have been willing to classify as within federal 
criminal statutes). But see Taber, On Computer Crime (Senate Bill S. 240), 1 COMPUTER/ 
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were introduced in the lOist Congress. 10 The intent of these laws is to 
deter individuals from unauthorized access to the protected systems 
and to create penalties for such behavior.ll Collectively, these laws 
treat computer systems as property worthy of protection against tres­
pass and conversion. 
Given the pervasiveness of computer systems and American soci­
ety's dependence on them, the increased attention to unauthorized 
computer access is warranted. Focusing solely on the perpetrators of 
computer fraud, however, is unlikely to prevent access by unauthor­
ized individuals or provide compensation for injured parties. 12 For 
example, perpetrators from abroad might not be within the reach of 
state and federal laws. 13 Skilled individuals will always be able to pen­
etrate computer systems, and a single individual or a small group of 
individuals would likely be unable to compensate injured parties, even 
if they were within the jurisdictional purview of the statute. 14 . 
Although individual intruders may attack computer systems at 
random, IS the more dangerous computer criminals are likely to be in~ 
L.J. 517, 518 (1979) ("[T]here is no such thing as a 'computer' crime, and therefore no need 
for special legislation addressing this ·problem.' "). 
Likewise, some commentators have advanced the theory of extending the constitu­
tional right of privacy, the common law right of privacy, and the right of privacy by statute 
to prevent computer abuse. Tunick, supra note 4, at 332-38. 
10. The two bills, H.R. 55, Virus Eradication Act, and H.R. 287, Computer Protec­
tion Act, were both intended to tighten protection of computer systems. While there is no 
unanimity about the need for computer crime statutes, the U.S. Government Accounting 
Office has charged that existing law is inadequate. See U.S. GOVERNMENT GENERAL Ac­
COUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/lMTEC-89-57, CoMPUTER SECURITY: VIRUS HIGH"­
LIGHTS NEED FOR IMPROVED INTERNET SECURITY (1989). One person h~ been charg~ 
under the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for releasing a program that interfered . 
with the operation of thousands of computers. See Wilke, Student Indicted on Charge 
Linked to Computer Virus, Wall St. J., July 27, 1989, at B7, col. 5. 
For a summary of bills which Congress has considered, see Branscomb, supra note 6, 
at 48-49; Taber, supra note 9, at 518; Note, Computer Abuse, supra note 5, at 84-,89. 
11. According to one commentator, "the focus of legislation should be on the nature 
of the asset subject to loss, rather than on the technology which is rapidly subject to obso­
lescence and requires repeated amendment." Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 208. 
12. Samuelson, Can Hackers Be Suedfor Damages Caused by Computer Vi~es?, 32 
CoMM. OF THE ACM 666, 667 (1989). 
13. See Stoll, Stalking the Wily Hacker, 31 CoMM. OF THE ACM 484, 489-90 (1988), 
for an account of the lengthy tracing of a German hacker's intrusion into American com­
puter networks. 
14. See Spafford, Crisis and Aftermath, 32 COMM. OF THE ACM 678, 678-~7 (989), 
for an account of the chaos on Internet, an American computer network, caused by l!, single 
intruder. . 
15. See generally Branscomb, supra note 6, at 6-30 (discussing several incidents in­
volving rogue behavior in computer networks and the motivation behind these events). 
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siders who have some legitimate access to the system. 16 Ironically, 
organizations have been reluctant to prosecute insiders for fear of em­
barrassing pUblicity over the vulnerabilities of organizational com­
puter systems. 17 Thus, society should not assume that laws addressing 
unauthorized use of computer·systems will be sufficient protection for 
users. 
In addition to legislating sanctions for perpetrators of computer 
break-ins, it is also appropriate to examine the responsibilities of peo­
ple and entities providing and managing computer systems. Accord­
ing to one expert, Clifford Stoll, poor systems management 
contributed significantly to a recent trespass into military networks. IS 
Stoll noted that after ten months of tracking the intruder, who at­
tacked about 450 computers and successfully entered more than thirty 
of them, "[m]ost of these break-ins were possible because the intruder 
exploited common blunders [made] by vendors, users, and system 
managers."19 He also noted, "[t]he security weaknesses of both sys­
tems and networks, particularly the needless vulnerability due to 
sloppy systems management and administration, result in a surprising 
success rate for unsophisticated attacks. "20 
Others have noted that lax implementation of security features 
and ineffective operating procedures make unauthorized access to 
computer systems simple.21 Usually the damage is only to the system 
itself in the form of lost or destroyed data. Sometimes, however, per­
sonal injury may result. For example, Stoll stated that the same in­
truder who entered the military networks also accessed a computer 
which controlled the "real-time" administration of medical treatment. 
Had the intruder not been detected, a patient may have been severely 
injured.22 
In a more widely publicized incident, a college student infected 
Internet, a network of computers for scientific research, with a pro­
16. For examples of insiders who have caused computer abuse, see Tunick, supra 
note 4, at 328-30. 
17. The Real Target, Computerworld, Feb. 27, 1989, at 20, col. 1. 
18. Stoll, supra note 13, at 484. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 492. 
21. T. EISENBERG, D. GRIES, J. HARTMANIS, D. HOLCOMB, M. LYNN & T. SAN­
TORO, THE COMPUTER WORM: A REPORT TO THE PROVOST OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
ON AN INVESTIGATION CoNDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION OF PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY 
(Feb. 6, 1989) [hereinafter CoRNELL UNIVERSITY]; Denning, The Science of Computing: 
Computer Viruses, 76 AM. SCIENTIST 236, 238 (1988). 
22. Stoll, supra note 13, at 489. 
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gram that reproduced itself on thousands of computers.23 The result 
was a disruption of normal activities and network connectivity for 
over a week.24 In another incident, an ex-employee of an insurance 
and brokerage firm was convicted of a felony for planting a computer 
time bomb in his former employer's computer system that was in­
tended to erase payroll data once a month.2s Clearly, there exists a 
growing number of incidents in which third parties are placed at risk 
due to unauthorized access to and misuse of organizational computer 
systems. 
Even though it is impossible to maintain perfectly secure sys­
tems,26 managers have a duty to provide reasonably secure systems by 
exercising care in the implementation and operation of their systems.27 
Part I of this article addresses the scope of potential negligence liabil­
ity for the providers of computer services who fail to exercise reason­
able care in securing and protecting their computer systems from 
unauthorized access.28 Part II of the article describes steps computer 
23. For another account ofthis incident, see Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2, at 
625-26. 
24. See generally CoRNELL UNIVERSITY, supra note 21; Rochlis & Eichin, With Mi­
croscope and Tweezers: The Worm from MIT's Perspective, 32 CoMM. OF THE ACM 689 
(1989); Spafford, supra note 14, at 678; How Computer Science Was Caught Off Guard by 
One Young Hacker, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1988, at AI, col. 1. 
25. Savage, Computer Time Bomb Defused; Felon Nailed, Computerworld, Sept. 26, 
1988, at 2, col. 4. 
26. Perfectly secure systems would keep out authorized users too and hence would 
be of no use to their owners. 
27. For tips on devising and implementing an effective computer' system, see Com­
ment, supra note 6, at 404-15. But see Note, Legal Antibiotic, supra note 3, at 254 ("In­
creased security measures are only a partial solution because they serve to create a more 
inviting challenge to the person compelled to demonstrate his computer programming 
skill."). 
28. See infra notes 30-106 and accompanying text. 
When an unknown and unauthorized "hacker" accesses personal data held by a pri­
vate enterprise, the enterprise itself is the victim's only source of recovery. As one author 
noted: 
There are several possible theories under which a victim may proceed. Gen­
erally, however, recovery is unlikely. Even if an enterprise owes a duty of care to 
another, it will not be liable for the tortious acts of third parties unless those acts 
were "reasonably foreseeable." In the past, this phrase has been narrowly con­
strued, making it difficult for a victim to recover his loss. 
Breach of contract is another alternative. An enterprise is held to the degree 
of skill possessed by ordinary members of that trade or business. If it fails to meet 
this level of care, it may be liable in contract. However, courts rarely extend 
protection for conduct not recognized within the professional community or ex­
pressly covered by the terms of the agreement; thus, unless an individual includes 
an express level of care in the contract, recovery is tenuous. 
Regardless of whether liability is founded in tort or contract, however, it is 
first necessary to determine what general standards of care are expected from 
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managers might take to satisfy a duty of reasonable care to safeguard 
the systems they manage.29 
I. POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE 
Individuals who gain unauthorized access to computer systems 
may be criminally30 and civilly liable for their actions. It is also true, 
however, that in each of the cases noted above there were steps the 
computer systems manager could have taken to significantly lessen the 
ease with which the intruder gained access to the affected computer 
system. In the case involving the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 
(LBL) and medical treatment break-ins, the systems manager did not 
enforce password expiration, require non-obvious passwords, delete 
expired accounts, or eliminate shared accounts. Taken together, these 
precautions would have reduced the risk of unauthorized access.31 In 
the Internet incident, the intruder exploited documented flaws in ven­
businesses which hold confidential data. If the injured party can prove the enter­
prise failed to exercise the standard of care required, he may recover. The prob­
lem is that there are no generally accepted standards with which to ascertain the 
degree of security required of any business. Thus, practitioners must persuasively 
argue that the business failed to meet even the most basic level of protection. 
Agranoff, Curb on Technology: Liability for Failure to Protect Computerized Data Against 
Unauthorized Access, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268 (1989) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Ware, Computer Security Standards for Government and In­
dustry: Where Will They Come From?, COMPUTER SECURITY J. 71 (1983). 
29. See infra notes 107-44 and accompanying text. 
30. Betts, Senate Takes Tentative Look at Virus Legislation, Computerworld, May 
22, 1989, at 8, col. 3. Existing federal laws generally require proof of criminal intent and 
damage, making prosecution of some intruders, for example, the perpetrator of the Internet 
worm, difficult. New legislation has been proposed to fill this gap. See supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
31. Stoll, supra note 13, at 490. Other possible security measures include: 
(1) Even if there is a general password to access a ... file, each authorized indi­
vidual should also have a password that is unique and not known to other individ­
uals; (2) The password should not be a proper name, common . . . term 
[associated with the business], or other easily-guessed item. It should be changed 
regularly. These mandates should be ·enforced by software; (3) After a small 
number of incorrect passwords, the line into the computer should be disconnected 
and security personnel promptly notified; (4) Encryption should be considered if 
extremely sensitive data is involved; (5) A contingency plan should be developed 
and tested in the event that phone lines into the computer are down for an ex­
tended period of time, ensuring that the computer can be updated "on site;" (6) 
Access control software should clearly define what users can access what data, 
under what conditions, and supported by a proper chain of authorized signatures; 
(7) Violation reports should be manageable and designed to produce adequate 
follow-up action; (8) Regular audits of computer security should be conducted by 
personnel trained in technical and administrative techniques, who are not em­
ployed by the data processing department. 
Agranoff, supra note 28, at 271 n.20. In addition, one commentator urges education on 
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dor-supplied software for which there were known remedies.32 In the 
payroll case, the company took cursory but not thorough steps to deny 
access to the former employee.33 
Since the actual wrongdoers in cases like these may not have the 
resources to compensate those injured by computer fraud, injured 
plaintiffs are likely to look for deeper pockets for their compensation. 
Managers with responsibility for an organization's computer systems 
may learn that their inexperience, lack of knowledge, or simple pro­
crastination in protecting their systems will expose their organizations 
to civil liability for negligence in the operation of the systems. 
A. Analysis of Negligence Actions Against Managers34 
Many computer systems managers would be appalled to learn 
that the actions of individuals obtaining unauthorized access to their 
systems could expose their employers to liability for resulting dam­
ages. Nonetheless, although there are no recorded cases on point,3S 
general principles of negligence36 provide precedent for the imposition 
computer abuse to bring computer crime under control. Note, Abuse Act, supra note 1, at 
84-86. 
32. Spafford, supra note 14, at 678-84. 
33. Savage, supra note 25, at 2. 
34. This article focuses on the potential liabilities of information systems managers. 
For an analysis of similar issues surrounding electronic bulletin board managers, see Soma, 
. Smith & Sprague, Legal Analysis 0/Electronic Bulletin Board Activities, 7 w. NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 571 (1985). 
35. A case, however, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit is worth noting in this context. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass0­
ciation, 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982) concerns a claim based on the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988). Section 16810 of the Act states that a consumer 
reporting agency is liable to consumers in the event of failure to'comply with the require­
ments of the Act. Among its requirements, the Act provides: "Whenever a consumer 
reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the 
report relates." 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1988) (emphasis added). 
In Thompson, the plaintiff argued that the San Antonio Retail Merchants Association 
(SARMA) had failed to implement reasonable computer practices, and, as a result, had 
provided erroneous credit reports to several organizations from which he attempted to ob­
tain credit. Thompson, 682 F.2d at 511-12. 
The trial court held that SARMA "failed to exercise reasonable care in programming 
its computer to automatically capture information into a file." Id. at 513. 
Although the basis of liability in the case is a federal statute rather than a common law 
negligence claim, it is significant that the court recognized that misuse of computers, based 
on a reasonable-person standard, could be the basis of liability for the provider of computer 
services. 
36. See generally Comment, "Computer Malpractice" and Other Legal Problems 
Posed by Computer "Vaporware", 33 VILL. L. REV. 835, 892 (1988) (advocating that "the 
judiciary should be more amenable to computer tort claims, and adopt computer malprac­
tice as a viable cause of action"). 
176 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:167 
of liability on systems managers. 37 
"[N]egligence is defined as 'the failure to exercise that degree of 
care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same 
or similar circumstances and when charged with like duty.' "38 In or­
der for the provider of computer services to be deemed legally negli­
gent,39 the injured party would have to prove the traditionally 
recognized elements of negligence: that the provider of computer serv­
ices had a duty to the injured party to exercise reasonable care in the 
creation, installation, or operation of the computer system; that the 
systems manager breached that duty by failing to exercise the requisite 
care; that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the in­
jury to the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff did in fact suffer physical 
injury, property damage or economic harm as a result of the breach.40 
1. Duty of Reasonable Care 
To hold a systems manager's employer liable for negligence, the 
plaintiff must first establish that the company, in the person of the 
systems manager, owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable or 
ordinary care in providing computer services. 41 Reasonable care is 
37. See Fossett, The Development of Negligence in Computer Law, 14 N. Ky. L. 
REv. 289, 293-95 (1987) (arguing that negligence on the part of a computer user is appro­
priately addressed by a claim in tort). 
38. Tharpe v. Brewer, 7 N.C. App. 432, 438, 172 S.E.2d 919,924 (1970) (quoting 
Williamson v. Clay, 243 N.C. 337, 345, 90 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1956». 
39. One commentator described negligence as follows: 
Negligence. Negligence occurs when an individual has failed to exercise pre­
scribed duties or has failed to carry out those duties in a prudent manner. Negli­
gence may arise because of either nonfeasance or malfeasance, and may be the 
result of an error of commission or omission on the part of [those] ... defending a 
lawsuit. 
Courts will be looking at the question of negligence in order to decide 
whether it was of such a nature as to be considered "ordinary" or "gross." Ordi­
nary negligence normally involves an act or a failure to act that resulted from 
simple carelessness or basic human error. At the other extreme, gross negligence 
involves what the court finds to be a reckless, willful, or wanton act or failure to 
act in view of the circumstances. . . . In computer fraud cases, the existence of 
scienter, or intent, on the part of the defendants may hinge on whether the negli­
gence is adjudged to be ordinary or gross, the implication being that gross negli­
gence translates to intent. 
L. KRAUSS & A. MACGAHAN, COMPUTER FRAUD'AND COUNTERMEASURES 337 (1979). 
40. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 
(1984). 
One commentator has noted that "the modern computer is not, for the most part in its 
current use today, a physically dangerous machine." Fossett, supra note 37, at 291. Conse­
quently, computers do not usually cause physical injury or property damage. Id. 
41. "[E]very case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are 
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generally defined as that degree of care that a similarly situated rea­
sonable person would exercise.42 The duty of reasonable care has lim­
its: the injured party must typically show that the defendant owed 
both a duty to the plaintiff and a duty to act or refrain from acting to 
avoid foreseeable harm. The concept of duty is a limitation on the 
scope of liability.43 Thus, duty imposes an obligation only towards 
those who would be foreseeably endangered and oruy with respect to 
those risks or hazards that are reasonably foreseeable. The manager of 
a computer system wou1d have a duty to use reasonable care to secure 
the system44 when it is reasonably foreseeable that failure to secure it 
would result in injury to others. While "others" encompasses a poten­
tially unlimited group, there are limits on how far liability would ex­
tend. A duty of care runs oruy to "foreseeable plaintiffs," any person 
or class of persons who could reasonably be expected to be injured by 
the systems manager's negligence. Although the manager's scope of 
duty is also limited to the kinds of injury that could reasonably be 
foreseen, the exact manner in which the injury is brought about need 
not be foreseeable.4s The presence or absence of a systems manager's 
duty to protect a plaintiff will be a function of the facts of a particular 
required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a result of their con­
duct." J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799,806,598 P.2d 60, 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 
411 (1979) (quoting Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 
Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1975». 
42. "[N]egligence 'consists in a want of that reasonable care which would be exer­
cised by a person of ordinary prudence under a/l the existing circumstances . ...'" Gowdy 
v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 738 (W.O. Mich. 1967) (quoting Detroit & M.R.R. v. 
Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 118-19 (1868», rev'd 412 F.2d 525, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 
(1969). 
43. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 (1986). 
44. There are various methods to protect a computer system, for example: 
Numerous security measures have been suggested for safeguarding the computer 
system from criminal attack. Some experts suggest that the system itself be kept 
under guard and be isolated from the other divisions of a fum. It is suggested, 
further, that the programmer not operate the computer. In addition, experts note 
that no employee should have access for too long a period of time to anyone stage 
of the computer's operation. Access should be on a need-to-know basis only. 
However, a computer can be safeguarded but never made fully impregnable. 
The primary factor behind computerization has been the economic motive. 
Extreme security measures could easily nullify the economic feasibility of a com­
puter system.... There is a need for deterrence, which only law enforcement and 
prosecution can provide. However, at present, our investigatory and 
prosecutorial machinery has been slow to adapt to this new form of crime. 
A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A 2Ch"H-CENTURY CRISIS 109 (1978) (endnotes 
omitted). 
45. See, e.g., R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 49-61 (1963). 
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case.46 
2. Breach of Duty 
Next, a potential plaintiff must show that a manager breached his 
or her duty of reasonable care. A systems manager might be found to 
have breached a duty of reasonable care for a number of reasons, such 
as the failure to recognize defects in a system, the failure to correct 
defects, or the failure to warn of defects.47 Because of the number of 
ways a computer can malfunction, proving negligence will be diffi­
cult.48 Breach of duty might also arise from failure to train and super­
vise employees,49 or the failure to use reasonable means to secure the 
system from unauthorized and unintended use. 
3. Proximate Cause of Injury 
The third element of a negligence claim is proof that the defend­
ant's act, or failure to act, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injury. 50 Stated generally, satisfying the element of proximate cause 
requires first, that the defendant's action be an actual cause, and sec­
ond, that the consequences of that act were foreseeable. 51 Finally, the 
plaintiff will need to prove that he or she was a foreseeable victim. 52 
There can be more than one proximate cause of an injury.53 For ex­
ample, in the case of the Internet intruder,54 the cause in fact of the 
injury was the illegal or unauthorized act of accessing the computers 
46. "The circumstances of each case supply the features from which breaches of duty 
and negligence arise." Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 738 (W.O. Mich. 1967). 
47. "There can be little doubt that the use of computer resources is changing the 
practice standards [of design engineers]. It is not difficult today to anticipate the misuse of 
computerized resources as negligence." Lurie & Weiss, Computer Assisted Mistakes: 
Changing Standards ofProfessional Liability, 2 SOFTWARE L.J. 283, 285 (1988). 
48. Note, Easing Plaintiffs' Burden ofProving Negligence for Computer Malfunction, 
69 IOWA L. REV. 241 (1983) (proposing a liberal use of the "res ipsa loquitur" doctrine in 
computer injury claims). . 
49. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra note 43, at § 18.7. 
50. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 30, at 165. For a complete overview of the causa­
tion issue in the common law, see Kratzke, The Convergence of the Discretionary Function 
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act With Limitations of Liability in Common Law 
Negligence, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 221, 228-32 (1986). 
51. The concept of "proximate cause" is subject to varied definitions. Black's Law 
Dictionary states that "[a]n injury or damage is proximately caused by an act, or a failure 
to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a 
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the 
injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act 
or omission." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990). 
52. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
53. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 44, at 301-02. 
54. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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on the Internet network, but the insufficient security system was also a 
cause. Even where the intervening act is illegal and unauthorized, a 
provider of computer services may not be relieved from liability for 
negligence due to failure to restrict access to a system. 55 If it was rea­
sonably foreseeable that the system might be sabotaged, the manager 
will be required to use reasonable means to protect against intrusion. 
While the manager cannot be required to impose absolute security, he 
or she should be charged with implementing reasonable access control. 
Reasonableness can be determined by several factors. 56 First; the 
amount of caution required increases with the likelihood of injury.57 
Second, as the severity of possible harm increases, the duty to protect 
against the harm likewise increases. 58 Thus, greater and more com­
prehensive measures would be expected for a system with critical or 
sensitive data. Third, the cost of avoiding foreseeable harm is also 
relevant. 59 The cost of protection will be balanced against the degree 
of risk and the seriousness of the possible resulting harm.6O Where the 
cost of protection in time or money is low, there may be a duty to 
protect against even remote risks.61 The manager will not be negli­
gent, however, where the cost of restricting access is significantly out 
of proportion to the risks.62 
As previously noted, a negligent or willful act, such as introduc­
ing a virus into a computer, could be th~ cause in fact of the resulting 
damage, such as altered or destroyed files or a system shutdown due to 
overload. The individual who introduces the virus may face criminal 
liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,63 as well as civil 
55. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
56. Reasonableness is often a function of cost. For example, one commentator 
noted: 
Computer security generally is concerned with the implementation of controls to 
meet exposures. Normally, however, only cost effective controls are consid­
ered.... Such a process is usually termed a risk assessment or risk analysis. It is 
virtually impossible with current technology to determine precisely the total set of 
exposures, the potential annualized loss from each exposure, the true cost of 
often-overlapping controls, and the resulting reduced annualized loss from each 
exposure. Therefore, in practice, controls are generally implemented only after 
an exposure occurs and is recognized as a problem by management. 
Agranoff, supra note 28, at 282-83 (footnotes omitted). 
57. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra note 43, § 16.9, at 469. 
58. Id. at 471. 
59. Id. at 477; see also Agranoff, supra note 28, at 276-308. 
60. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra note 43, § 57, at 477. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See. e.g., Alexander, Morris Indicted in Internet Affair, Computerworld, July 31, 
1989. at 8, col. 1. Robert T. Morris, who allegedly planted a worm which shut down 
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penalties. But the provider of computer services may also be liable, 
unless the acts of the first individual are deemed to be superseding, 
which would cut off the provider's liability.64 The provider's liability 
will depend upon the scope of the original foreseeable risk that the 
manager created through lax security practices. "If the intervening 
cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be 
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under 
the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among 
other reasons, because of failing to guard against it. "65 Because the 
courts generally agree that only foreseeable causes of harm will not 
supersede the defendant manager's liability,66 the provider of com­
puter serviceS will be liable only if the intervening cause was foresee­
able.67 Once it is determined that the systems manager has a duty to 
anticipate the intervening misconduct and guard against it, this mis­
conduct cannot supersede the liability of a provider of computer 
services.68 
The same result would follow even if the hacker's actions consti­
tuted criminal conduct. Normally, one may proceed upon the as­
sumption that others will obey the law.69 However, where past 
experience indicates that criminal conduct should reasonably be antic­
ipated, and especially when the potential injury is serious, the systems 
manager is presumably still liable to those harmed by the failure to 
safeguard the system.70 Dean William Prosser cites the following as 
thousands of computers on the nationwide Internet network, is the first person to face 
federal prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. In January, 1990, 
Robert Morris was found "guilty of illegally running a worm program on thousands of 
computers scattered across the country." Alexander, Morris Verdict Stirs Debate, Com­
puterworld, Jan. 29, 1990, at I, col. 3. 
64. The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a 
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's 
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third 
person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent 
conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation 
might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity 
to commit such a tort or crime. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). 
65. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 44, at 303 (footnote omitted). 
66. Id. at 303-04. 
67. Id. at 302. 
68. Id. at 305. 
69. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 33, at 198-99; see, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky & 
I.B.R.R. Co., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910) (criminal act of another was the interven­
ing act that broke the chain of causation). 
70. The criminal conduct of others does not break the chain of causation where there 
have been prior similar criminal incidents. See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra 
note 43, § 16.12, at 495-96. 
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common examples of this concept: "if valuable property is left un­
guarded and exposed to the public view, it may be anticipated that it 
will be stolen; if the key is left in the lock of a jewelry store over a 
holiday, it is not at all unlikely that there will be a burglary."71 
Similarly, if a computer system is left unprotected, it is likely that 
information in that system will be stolen, altered, or lost. With the 
risk of misconduct clearly foreseeable, the manager must use reason­
able means to restrict access to the system. 
4. Injury 
The final element a plaintiff must prove in a negligence action is 
that he or she has suffered an injury.72 This element raises an interest­
ing issue in computer cases in that the injuries suffered are often purely 
economic.73 While one can readily envision circumstances in which a 
security breach or a software malfunction could result in physical in­
jury,14 most of the injuries will be economic.75 The exact form or 
manner of conceivable injuries is virtually unlimited. 
Traditionally, English and American courts have denied negli­
gence claims for purely economic losses.76 This prohibition, some­
times called the per se prohibitory rule,77 bars recovery for economic 
losses unaccompanied by physical injury or property damage.78 The 
71. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 33, at 203. 
72. Id. § 30, at 165. 
73. See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. BasiclFour Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 
1982) (California law does not allow recovery for economic loss in computer-related negli­
gence claim.). 
74. See generally Massingale & Borthick, Risk Allocation for Injury Due to Defective 
Medical Software, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 181 (1988), for a discussion of physical injury and 
death which resulted from software malfunction involving the use of computer-assisted 
radiation therapy. For a discussion of injuries involved in computer use in engineering, see 
Lurie & Weiss, supra note 47. 
75. See generally Reed, Negligence and Computer Software, 1987 J. Bus. L. 444. 
76. Note, TORTS-DAMAGE~New Jersey Recognizes Negligence Action for 
Purely Economic Losses Unaccompanied by Physical Harm-People Express Airlines, Inc. 
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246,495 A.2d 107 (1985), 17 SETON HALL L. REv. 
719 (1987) [hereinafter Note, New Jersey]; see also Harvey, Economic Losses and Negli­
gence, 50 CANADIAN B. REV. 580, 581-82 (1972); James, Limitations on Liability for Eco­
nomic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REv. 43, 45-46 
(1972). 
77. Note, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1181, 
1188 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Purely Economic Loss] (reviewing the history of the per se 
rule); Note, New Jersey, supra note 76, at 719; see also People Express Airlines v. Consoli­
dated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 251, 495 A.2d 107, 109 (1985). 
78. Note, Purely Economic Loss, supra note 77, at 1182 n.3 (listing the leading cases 
barring recovery for purely economic loss); see also People Express Airlines, 100 N.J. at 251, 
495 A.2d at 109; Note, New Jersey, supra note 76, at 719. 
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policy reasons for limiting or denying recovery for purely economic 
loss were based, in part, on the fear of exposing a defendant to unlim­
ited liability, which might be too severe given his conduct,79 However, 
there are numerous problems with this position, and in recent years 
courts have used several alternative lines of reasoning to limit the 
scope of liability while at the same time creating numerous exceptions 
to the per se prohibitory rule.80 
Some of the early cases that allowed recovery for purely economic 
harm absent physical injury limited the scope of liability of the defend­
ant by requiring a special relationship between the tortfeasor and a 
foreseeable plaintiff.81 Eventually, some courts began to focus on fore­
seeability rather than physical damages as a means of limiting liability, 
even when a special relationship did not exist. 82 
The physical harm rule was traditionally premised on policy con­
cerns of preventing mass litigation, fraudulent claims, and liability dis­
proportionate to the defendant's fault. 83 The physical harm rule, 
however, was intended to limit, not deny, recovery for economic 
79. Dente, Negligence Liability to All Foreseeable Parties for Pure Economic Harm: 
The Final Assault Upon the Citadel, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 589 (1987); Rabin, 
Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1513, 1534 (1985); Note, Recent Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 444, 448 (1974). 
80. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Lakeshore Inc., 753 F.2d 851, 856 (1Oth Cir. 1985) 
(economic losses allowed under New Mexico law); Babson Bros. Co. v. Tipstar Corp., 446 
N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (economic loss allowed if proximately caused); Groppel 
Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (economic loss 
allowed without accompanying physical damage). See generally James, Economic Loss: 
The Floodgates, 1987 DENNING L.J. 97 (discussing three rationales which courts have used: 
reasonable foresight, economic loss recovery only where accompanied by injury to person 
or property, and the loss/reliance mechanism). 
81. See. e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) 
(tort liability may be based on relationship between attorney who drafted will negligently 
and plaintiffs who lost inheritance as a result), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Rozny v. 
Mamul, 43 III. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (finding tort liability where error by land 
surveyor resulted in substantial costs to plaintiff purchaser of house despite the fact that 
survey was not contracted for by plaintiffs); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 
275 (1922) (tort liability may be based on relationship between public weighers of mer chan­
dise who erroneously certified weight of product and purchasers of product). 
82. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804, 598 P.2d 60, 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
407,410 (1979) (finding tort liability on part of building contractor where renovations took 
excessive amount of time and cost plaintiff lessee lost revenues, because it was foreseeable 
that defendant's activity would affect plaintiff); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 
352, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (liability established where stockholder suffered loss from 
independent auditor's inaccurate public statement). 
83. People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 252, 495 A.2d 
107, lIO (1985) (construing Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 823 (2d 
Cir. 1968»; see also Note, Purely Economic Loss, supra note 77, at 1190-94. 
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loss.84 In People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corporation,8S 
the New Jersey Supreme Court cited several objectives to be furthered 
in allowing recovery for purely economic harm within certain parame­
ters. These objectives included the need to compensate innocent vic­
tims for their injury, the need to discourage similar negligent behavior 
in the future, the need to foster safer products, a desire to vindicate 
reasonable conduct that shows regard for safety, and the need to shift 
costs of dangerous activities to those better able to sustain such 
costs.86 
In an effort to balance these competing objectives, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court specifically rejected the per se prohibitory rule and al­
lowed People Express Airlines to pursue its claim for purely economic 
loss when a railway accident caused a tank car containing flammable 
liquid to spill into a freight yard and ignite. 87 The spill, which 
presented a threat of explosion and other health hazards, forced the 
evacuation of the area within a one-mile radius of the accident site.88 
Although the fire was contained and an explosion never occurred, the 
accident forced the People Express Airlines' reservation office, located 
in the affected area, to interrupt its business operations for twelve 
hours, which resulted in substantial financial losses. 89 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision, which found 
that recovery was not automatically barred by the absence of physical 
damages.9o The New Jersey Supreme Court stressed that recovery for 
purely economic losses would be limited to plaintiffs, or classes of 
plaintiffs, whom the defendant knew or had reason to know would 
likely suffer damages due to the defendant's conduct.91 The People 
84. People Express Airlines, 100 N.J. at 254, 495 A.2d at 111. 
85. 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985). 
86. Id. at 255, 495 A.2d at 111. 
87. Id. at 267-68, 495 A.2d at 118. 
88. Id. at 249, 495 A.2d at 108. 
89. Id. at 249-50, 495 A.2d at 108-09. 
90. Id. at 250, 495 A.2d at 109. 
91. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
We conclude therefore that a defendant who has breached his duty of care to 
avoid the risk of economic injury to particularly foreseeable plaintiffs may be held 
liable for actual economic losses that are proximately caused by its breach of 
duty. In this context, those economic losses are recoverable as damages when 
they are the natural and probable consequence of a defendant's negligence in the 
sense that they are reasonably to be anticipated in view of defendant's capacity to 
have foreseen that the particular plaintiff or identifiable class of plaintiffs ... is 
demonstrably within the risk created by defendant's negligence. 
Id. at 267, 495 A.2d at 118. 
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Express decision illustrates that the courts can effectively limit the 
scope of liability for economic harm without requiring physical injury. 
One difficulty in allowing recovery for property damage, but not 
for economic loss, is that the distinction between the two is unconvinc­
ing.92 For example, if a car is negligently damaged, the owner com­
plains about the cost of repair - an economic loss.93 The requirement 
of physical injury to person or property before compensation for eco­
nomic loss may lead to obviously unjust results: 
[T]he distinction between physical and economic loss brings us to 
the ridiculous point that if the same plaintiff suffers economic loss 
arising out of a physical injury and also similar economic loss (but 
not arising from physical injury) in consequence of the same wrong­
ful act[,] he can recover under the one head but not under the 
other.94 
In lieu of requiring physical damage as a means of limiting the 
defendant's scope of liability, many courts have required that the de­
fendant's duty be limited by contract law. Where parties have volun­
tarily entered into a relationship having the features ofa contract, the 
law enforces only those terms agreed to in the bargain. With respect 
to negligence in the provision of computer services, it may be that to 
impose duties that were never mutually assented to by the parties 
would be inherently wrong.95 
92. Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American 
Products Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. 647, 651 (1977); Fallon, Physical Injury and Economic 
Loss - The Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer, 27 VILL. L. REv. 483, 484-85 (1981­
82); James, supra note 80, at 103. 
93. James, supra note 80, at 103. Consider also the example given by Judge Kauf­
man in Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968): 
To anyone familiar with N. Y. traffic there can be no doubt that a foreseeable 
result of an accident in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during rush hour is that 
thousands of people will be delayed. A driver who negligently caused such an 
accident would certainly be held accountable to those physically injured in the 
·crash. But we doubt that damages would be recoverable against the negligent 
driver in favor of truckers or contract carriers who suffered provable losses be­
cause of the delay or to the wage earner who was forced to "clock in" an hour 
late.' And yet it was surely foreseeable that among the many who wo'uld be 
delayed would be truckers and wage earners. 
Id. at 825 n.8. 
94. James, supra note 80, at 103-04; see also Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin 
(Contractors) Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 27. 
95. In an analogous situation, a majority of the members of the Spedal Committee 
on Computers and the Law of the New York Bar Association indicated that in cases of 
claims against vendors of defective software, resulting in purely economic injuries, "tradi­
tional contract law should apply." Special Committee on Computers and the Law, Tort 
Theories in Computer Litigation, 38 REC. A. B. CITY N.Y. 426, 427 (1983). Dissenting 
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There is some argument that contract theories rather than negli­
gence theories should control all computer cases resulting in economic 
loss.96 However, this approach does not address the many incidents in 
which computer use or malfunction causes injury to third parties who 
were not parties to the initial bargain.97 For example, suppose an un­
authorized individual corrupts the files of a credit bureau which issues 
an erroneous credit report, causing a bank to deny credit to a business 
which then fails due to lack of credit. The damages are essentially 
economic, and there is no privity of contract between the business and 
the credit bureau.98 However, to deny recovery in this instance for 
lack of privity of contract is fundamentally unfair. Arguably, it would 
be more appropriate to allow the injured party to seek recovery in tort 
and limit the scope of the credit bureau's liability under concepts of 
foreseeability and proximate cause.99 
Although the road to tort recovery for purely economic loss has 
been long and circuitous in the American court system,IOO some recent 
decisions point toward recovery for economic harm based on reason­
able foreseeability.lol While the ability to collect for purely economic 
injury is uncertain, tort theories of recovery will continue to be as­
serted. The legal system must develop means to address the unique 
issues emerging as society rapidly grows more computer-dependent 
and the potential for serious economic harm to computer users in­
creases. To avoid unjustified liability for the providers of computer 
services, careful assessments must be made as to the kinds of precau­
tions a systems-manager could reasonably take to safeguard computer 
members of the committee were not willing to foreclose the possibility of tort liability in 
appropriate circumstances. Id. at 445. 
96. See. e.g., Conley, Tort Theories of Recovery Against Vendors of Defective 
Software, 13 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. L.J, 1 (1987); Fossett, supra note 37, at 292; 
Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 173, 
189-96 (1981); Nycum, Liability for MalfUnction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS J. 
CoMPUTERS, TECH & L. 1,9-15 (1979). 
97. Fossett, supra note 37, at 291-92 (arguing that this is why computer tort claims 
are on the rise). 
98. A credit reporting service that misidentified an Individual as a bad credit risk has 
been found "negligent by failing to exercise reasonable care when programming its com­
puter to capture and disseminate information correctly." See LaPlante, Liability in the 
Information Age, INFOWORLD, Aug. 18, 1986, at 37. 
99. See supra notes 5007l and accompanying text. 
100. See generally Dente, supra note 79 (discussing the evolution of recovery for 
purely economic injury); Note, Purely Economic Loss, supra note 77 (regarding the histori­
cal and policy basis of the per se rule). 
101. See. e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799,598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
407 (1979); People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 
(1985); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324,461 A.2d 138 (1983). 
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resources. Actioii~ constituting reasonable care on a systems man­
ager's part must be defined. 
B. Statute ofLimitations 
Even where all the elements of a negligence action are present, a 
claim for relief may be barred by a statute of limitations. 102 
In ordinary negligence actions, the statute begins to run once the 
negligent act or omission that caused the damage occurs. 103 However, 
when a hacker infiltrates a computer system with a "time bomb,"l04 
this will present a different legal problem. Did the harmful act occur 
when the hacker first breached the computer's security, when the virus 
became active, or when the effect was first realized? 
One author suggests the courts resolve this question by analogy to 
professional malpractice negligence. lOS The statute of limitations in 
many states does not begin to run in malpractice actions until the 
"time of discovery." However, to date, no court has adopted the con­
cept of "computer malpractice."106 
II. DEFINING THE DuTY OF CARE FOR SYSTEMS MANAGERS 
In the event of a suit charging a provider of computer services 
with negligence, one of the principal issues to be examined, assuming 
the existence of a duty,107 will be whether the systems manager exer­
cised reasonable care in safeguarding the computer resources at issue. 
This Section will define responsible managerial practices to which the 
court may look in determining whether a manager has in fact met the 
duty of reasonable care. 
102. "Statutes of the federal government and various states setting the maximum 
time periods during which certain actioris can be brought or rights enforced. After the time 
period set out ... has run, no legal action can be brought ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTION­
ARY 927 (6th ed. 1990). 
103. See, e.g., H. Hirschfield Sons, Co. v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 107 Mich. 
App. 720, 309 N.W.2d 714 (1981) (Where truck scales were negligently installed, the stat­
ute ran from the date of the wrong, not when damage occurred.). 
104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
105. Comment, Computer Malpractice: Are Computer Manufacturers, Service Bu­
reaus, and Programmers Really the Professionals They Claim to Be?, 23 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1065, 1089-91 (1983). 
106. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 
1979) (negligence action regarding computer installation barred by statute of limitations); 
see also Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 n.l (D.N.J. 
1979) ("Simply because an activity is technically complex and important to the business 
community does not mean that greater potential liability must attach. . . . [T]he Court 
declines the invitation to create a new tort:-'), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). 
107. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. 
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Managers must be informed about their syst~ms' vulnerabilities 
and must make informed choices about which seCurity provisions to 
implement and how to enforce them. As the risk of harm increases, 
managers will be expected to use greater care in protecting systems 
and verifying the effectiveness of security measures. In general, a 
manager's duty may be defined as a duty to select and implement se­
curity provisions, to monitor their effectiveness, and to maintain the 
provisions in accordance with changing security needs. 
Since security features hinder system access and users want sys­
tems that are easily accessible, there are conflicts between the need for 
security and the desire for ease of use. For example, if passwords are 
hard to remember, users are likely to write them down, making the 
passwords accessible to potential intruders. Even on the occasion of 
substantial harm due to the activities of a network intruder, to8 users 
caution against overreacting to real or perceived threats in ways that 
jeopardize a system's usefulness. 109 This "cost" in the ease of using 
computer systems should be considered in determining whether a 
manager has exercised reasonable care. 1to However, despite this legiti­
mate concern for ease of use, it is apparent from a legaJ standpoint 
that managers should err on the side of caution. 
A. Selecting and Implementing Security Provisions 
To select the right combination of security features, managers 
must be familiar with the operating systems (control programs that 
regulate the use of all system resources), the applications software 
(programs that accomplish specific tasks for users), and the interac­
tions between operating system and application software. 111 Managers 
configure computer systems for their organizations from vendor-pro­
vided options and organization-developed enhancements. Thus, man­
agers have a responsibility to select the right combination of 
parameters and options for their environments prior to their 
implementation. 
1. Selection and Implementation Choices 
Knowing that their products will be used in a variety of environ­
108. See generally Spafford, supra note 14, at 678. 
109. King, Overreaction to External A.ttacks on Computer Systems Could Be More 
Harmful Than the Viruses Themselves, The Chronicle of Higher Edue., Nov. 23, 1988, at 
A36, col. 1. 
110. See Agranolf, supra note 28; supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. 
111. See generally 2 M. WOFSEY, ADVANCES IN COMPUTER SECURITY MANAGE­
MENT 1-37, 143-59 (1983). 
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ments, vendors generally provide customization options which may be 
specified at installation time, that permit systems managers to tailor 
systems to their organization's needs. 112 In order to facilitate installa­
tion, however, vendors often configure systems with default values for 
parameters for user priorities, resource use limits, job accounting, and 
file protection. Default configurations typically disable available se­
curity features, and master accounts typically have default passwords 
such as "system" or "test." Intruders usually try default user account 
and password values first. Therefore, a manager will be expected to 
understand what the default values are and what they imply for secur­
ity, choose the appropriate set of options, and replace default pass­
words with secure ones. The choices a manager makes must also be 
documented. Without such documentation, a computer manager's 
successor is likely to inherit a poorly secured system. Consequently, 
he will be unaware of its vulnerabilities. I 13 
One kind of option in many systems consists of "backdoor en­
tryways left over from software development.""4 These paths facili­
tate software development by making debugging easier. One such 
path, the DEBUG command for verifying receipt of mail at a network 
node, was used by the Internet intruder. The command permits the 
sender to invoke commands at the recipient node. The Internet in­
truder took advantage of this flaw to transmit commands that would 
propagate unauthorized programs." S Although backdoor entryways 
may be useful and necessary for initial maintenance and debugging, 
managers should disable such features before making systems avail­
able to their users. Vendors should document such features for cus­
tomers so they can make informed choices to enable them to plan for 
their use only under controlled operating conditions. 
2. User Education 
Since the line between use and misuse of computer systems may 
be hard to discern, system managers have a duty to explain to their 
users how the application systems are intended to be used and what 
restrictions apply to each user. A manager's explanation to users 
should include written documentation. 116 In addition to application 
112. M. MURPHY & X. PARKER, HANDBOOK OF EDP AUDITING § 27-20 (2d ed. 
1989). 
113. See Morris & Thompson, Password Security: A Case History, 32 CoMM. OF THE 
ACM 594, 596 (1979), for a list of easily guessed passwords. 
114. Stoll, supra note 13, at 493. 
115. Spafford, supra note 14, at 678-79. 
116. McGuire, Product-Use Instructions: How to Evaluate Them in Manufacturer 
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documentation, systems managers should make clear to their users 
"rules about what is acceptable and unacceptable conduct when using 
the system." 117 
3. Access Control 
Managers must be aware of the nature of the information in sys­
tem files and the extent of the security that is appropriate for different 
kinds of files. All files should be subject to periodic backup so that if 
they are damaged by an intruder, files can be restored readily.118 Ad­
ditionally, managers must know which individuals are authorized, for 
what type of access, to what information, and under what conditions. 
For example, inventory clerks might be authorized for access only 
during their assigned shift with update access to inventory quantities 
but read-only access to price data. 119 
Moreover, the concern with access authorization should extend 
to documentation about systems. 120 With sufficient documentation 
available to them, clever intruders may discover how to masquerade as 
legitimate users. 121 
Managers should be responsible for implementing procedural and 
programmed security provisions so that the desired level of control is 
achieved in environments where there are many users, where their 
passwords are vulnerable to exposure, and where there are software 
errors. 122 In addition, an important aspect of security implementation 
is separating incompatible functions of authorizing access privileges, 
specifying access privileges for individuals to the system, and review­
ing records of computer access for patterns of fraudulent activity. 
Negligence, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 293, 293-97 (1988) (discussing manufacturers' product-use 
instructions). Systems managers could be thought of as manufacturers for the purpose of 
designating the content of user documentation. 
117. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 669. Acceptable conduct for computer users 
means, for example, their (1) using only those computer accounts authorized for their use 
and using them only for the purposes for which they were authorized, (2) making appropri­
ate use of system-provided protection features such as passwords and not attempting to 
subvert passwords or other restrictions on account use, and (3) accessing the files of others 
only with express permission for authorized purposes. 
118. R. WEBER, EDP AUDmNG: CoNCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICE 294 
(1988). 
119. Id. at 515. 
120. Id. at 295. 
121. D. PARKER, CRIME By CoMPUTER 59-70 (1976) (access to system documenta­
tion enabled outsider to pose as Pacific Bell employee and embezzle equipment from the 
company). 
122. Murray, Computer-Related Crime and Auditing in the Nineties, II THE EDP 
AUDITOR J. 25, 25-30 (1990). 
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Separating these functions means vesting each one in a different indi­
vidual or group of individuals. 
Access control123 is typically implemented through user identifi­
cation codes ("user IDs") corresponding to user accounts, together 
with their associated passwords. User IDs identify individuals, while 
passwords allow the individuals to validate themselves as the owners 
of the user IDs. Thus, knowledge of user IDs and passwords may 
permit intruders to masquerade as authorized individuals. Since user 
IDs are generally not subject to even casual protection, knowledge of 
passwords is effectively all that intruders require to gain system access. 
Historically, users have been careless with passwords. They 
choose obvious combinations such as their initials or their spouses' 
names and write them down in obvious places. 124 As a result, manag­
ers must force periodic password changes so that intruders cannot 
guess or detect passwords even with repeated attempts. As intruders 
become more sophisticated in deciphering passwords, managers must 
take more elaborate security steps, such as encrypting passwords so 
that intruders are unlikely to uncover them even with unlimited com­
puter time at their disposa1. 12s 
A crucial aspect of implementing computer security is mainte­
nance of control over the content of all software on the system. 126 
Software integrity is vital because if intruders can corrupt software, 
especially control programs with system-wide access and privileges, 
they can manipulate systems more easily.127 Customary procedures 
for assuring software integrity include: restricting access to program 
code solely to the employees responsible for implementing and run­
ning it; 128 requiring separate developmental and production software 
123. See R. WEBER, supra note 118, at 309-56, for a discussion of access control. 
124. Observation of the daily security coding in a bank's wire transfer room enabled 
a consultant to make an unauthorized wire transfer of $10.2 million from Security Pacific 
National Bank. FBI Arrests Suspect In Bank Funds Theft and Finds Diamonds, Wall St. J., 
Nov. 7, 1978, at 24, col. 3. 
125. See Morris & Thompson, supra note 113, at 594. The authors describe the need 
for and the evolution of increasingly sophisticated password security. In addition to en­
crypting passwords, they recommend forcing users to use less predictable passwords, con­
cealing the list of encrypted passwords, and using time-consuming encryption algorithms. 
Id. 
126. F. GALLEGOS, D. RICHARDSON & A. BORTHICK, AUDIT AND CONTROL OF 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 195-96 (1987). Control over software content is important be­
cause data integrity depends on programs to do all of what they are supposed to do and 
nothing else. If programs are changed surreptitiously, then the perpetrators might be able 
to manipulate organizational data for their own purposes. 
127. R. WEBER, supra note 118, at 185-86. For example, privileged system software 
could be used to gain access to private data that could be sold to competitors. 
128. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON 
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libraries;129 requiring management authorization for program changes 
and approval for installation;130 and verifying the legitimacy of pro­
duction programs on periodic and random bases.13I 
B. Monitoring Effectiveness 
The manager has a duty to monitor the effectiveness of the opera­
tion of security provisions. Monitoring should include verifying that 
security provisions work as intended and analyzing attempted accesses 
to identify fraudulent ones. Attempted accesses should be logged for 
examination and all suspicious activity should be investigated. 132 
Monitoring security effectiveness also encompasses an awareness 
of the temptations to individuals for fraudulent activity.133 Individu­
als with access to computer systems should be screened, and employee 
attitudes and satisfaction should be monitored. 134 There should be a 
legitimate grievance procedure for dissatisfied employees - especially 
those who actively use the system and have access to computer files. 
The most dissatisfied employee may be an ex-employee or someone 
about to become an ex-employee. 135 Therefore, managers should im­
mediately implement procedures that deny access to terminated em­
ployees. 136 For laid-off employees subject to The Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act· of 1988,137 managers should either 
deny access privileges altogether or monitor their activities. 
Another problem concerning security effectiveness is system fail­
ures. Abrupt system failures create opportunities for compromising 
AUDITING STANDARDS No. 55, CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERNAL CoNTROL STRUC­
TURE IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT ~ 11, at 6 (1988). This statement generally 
establishes the requirements of an internal control structure comprising the control envi­
ronment, the accounting system, and control procedures, for the purpose of giving reason­
able assurance that transactions are authorized, transactions are recorded accurately, 




131. Id. at 7. 
132. F. GALLEGOS, D. RICHARDSON & A. BORTHICK, supra note 126, at 496-97; I. 
MARTIN, SECURITY, ACCURACY, AND PRIVACY IN CoMPUTER SYSTEMS 186-87 (1973). 
133. See R. ELLIOTT & I. WILLINGHAM, MANAGEMENT FRAUD: DETECTION AND 
DETERRENCE (1980). 
134. A. HUTT & S. BOSWORTH, COMPUTER SECURITY HANDBOOK 33-45 (2d ed. 
1988). 
135. Id. at 41. 
136. See Savage, supra note 25, at 2 (failure to deny fonner employee all computer 
access led to the deletion of payroll information). 
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988). The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Noti­
fication Act provides for employer notification for plant closings and mass layoffs. , 
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systems. When a system crashes, computer operators attempt to re­
store processing quickly to minimize user inconvenience. If security 
features impede restoring the system quickly, computer operators may 
disable access control and forget to restore it when the crisis passes. 
Managers should have procedures for reviewing system activity associ­
ated with restarting failed systems to verify that security is disabled 
only when absolutely necessary and is quickly restored. 138 
C. Maintaining Systems 
1. Changing Computing Environments 
Managers must take reasonable care to modify security provisions 
in accordance with changing security needs. The computing environ­
ment continually evolves: systems grow in size and in the number of 
access points; new versions of hardware and software are regularly 
provided to users; there are increases in the number of users, in the 
computing competence of individuals and society generally, and in the 
complexity of systems. Security features appropriate in one environ­
ment may be ineffective in another. One event that should always sig­
nal the need to reevaluate security features is the implementation of 
new software or new versions of existing software. A manager is 
tempted to implement new software in the same manner as the old 
software. The risk is that this default approach may lead to unantici­
pated vulnerabilities. 139 
2. System Flaws 
Even if vendors follow the best hardware and software develop­
ment practices, they cannot guarantee error-free systems. It is a man­
ager's responsibility to decide, primarily through testing, whether 
systems and subsystems are sufficiently error-free so that if they were 
installed, their use would not lead to unpredictable or destructive be­
havior. As far as possible; managers should test new products in isola­
tion so that if the products are corrupted,14O the damage can be 
confined to the test system. To minimize the likelihood of acquiring 
138. R. WEBER, supra note 118, at 186. Systems are vulnerable just after failures 
when the need to get jobs running overrides the need to maintain established control 
procedures. 
139. F. GALLEGOS, D. RICHARDSON & A. BORTHICK, supra note 126, at 352-53. 
For example, the vendor may change default values for security-related features or"change 
the features themselves. Vendors typically help systems managers understand revisions by 
including lists of feature changes in documentation for revised software. 
140. See Tuck, The Aftermath afthe Virus, I THE EDP AUDITOR J. 9, 10 (1989), for 
an account of the purchase of corrupted software from a commercial vendor. 
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maliciously corrupted software, managers should buy software only 
from authorized sources. 141 
Software inevitably has flaws because no known developmental 
technique guarantees error-free software. 142 The more complex the 
software, the more likely it is to contain errors. Verifying the absence 
of intentional errors is even more difficult. 143 Consequently, vendors 
are continually patching software when fatal or costly errors come to 
their attention. System managers should report these problems 
promptly to vendors. When vendors distribute software patches for 
correcting software errors, system managers should implement them 
only after thorough testing. Clifford Stoll attributes the reluctance to 
publicize patches for security functions "to the paranoia surrounding 
these discoveries . . . and [ to] the lack of channels to spread the 
news."I44 Vendors have a responsibility to document security-related 
patches and to take positive steps to distribute them to customers, 
whether they are purchasers or lessees. 
CONCLUSION 
There is considerable tension among computer users between the 
need for free access to computers and concerns for security. The aca­
demic community in particular has warned against overreaction to re­
cent incidents of computer abuse and has stressed the need for 
continued openness and accessibility of computer networks. 145 A bal­
ance between these two concerns is clearly needed even though the 
potential for serious harm, where software is infected or sensitive in­
formation is exposed, tips the balance in favor of security. 
Systems managers cannot be expected to be insurers of security, 
nor can they be responsible for all problems and wrongful acts by third 
141. Denning, supra note 21, at 238. 
142. See Fetzer, Program Verification: The Very Idea, 31 COMM. OF THE ACM, 
1048, 1049-63 (1988), for a discussion of the difficulties inherent in verifying the correctness 
of computer programs. Fetzer states that program performance cannot be guaranteed be­
cause it is a function of the interaction of ill-defined components, i.e., software, firmware, 
and hardware, and is thus probabilistic rather than deterministic. Repeated tests give only 
inductive evidence of reliability, which is insufficient to prove program correctness. Id. at 
1061. 
143. Thompson, Reflections on Trusting Trust, 27 COMM. OF THE ACM 761, 762-63 
(1984). Thompson explains how to change a compiler to make it deliberately miscompile 
source code whenever it encountered a particular pattern. With this technique, intentional 
unauthorized features could be introduced into programs. This example demonstrates 
Thompson's point that no amount of source-level verification will identify all errors, with 
the result that well-installed bugs will be almost impossible to detect. 
144. Stoll, supra note 13, at 493. 
145. King, supra note 109. 
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parties. Managers will, however, be expected to use reasonable means 
to secure computer systems and protect information - especially 
when there is significant potential for harm to innocent third parties. 
What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the circumstances of 
each case and will change over time. Systems managers must be aware 
of the potential liability and should document all security-related fea­
tures and their effectiveness. 
